Blocking by name is best-effort.
Encrypted DNS, Encrypted ClientHello, and connections to hard-coded IP addresses can slip a name-based block, and a socket already open before you blocked it is not cut. The whole-app firewall is the reliable option when you need one app fully stopped.
It does not break real encryption.
Version 1 sees where a connection is going, not what is inside it. In the Full instrument, decryption is opt-in, needs a certificate you install yourself, and works only for apps that permit it. Banks and messengers that pin their certificates stay opaque by design.
Some depth needs a provisioned device.
Kernel-level capture, per-process tracing, and blocking a force-stop from Settings require privileges Android will not hand a normal app. Those live in the Full instrument on hardware you have provisioned yourself.
Self-defense is bounded by the platform.
Locking, wiping, beaconing, and evidence capture run fine in the background. An alarm, a photo, or an audio clip may wait until the app is next opened, because Android restricts starting a camera or microphone from a background task, and it forces a visible indicator when either runs.